New Lies for Old - book written by Soviet defector

[Sarah]

By the end of the 1970s the expansion of trade and credit had
allowed overall communist indebtedness to the Western world to rise
to a total of about $70 billion. The growth of East-West trade had a
pronounced effect on the overall Western approach to the communist
world, since it built up powerful vested interests in the continuance of
detente despite the growth of communist military power and other
indications of aggressive communist intentions.
Detente and disinformation on communist "evolution" provided
grounds for socialist parties to view with greater favor the formation
of united fronts with communist parties. Apart from improving the
chances of socialists' gaining power, united fronts looked like a
promising device for influencing communist parties to move closer to
social democracy and further from the Soviet Union. Such ideas were
strong in the Italian, West German, French, and Finnish socialist
parties. In general, socialist parties looked less favorably on coalitions
or electoral alliances with center parties. The general leftward trend of
the 1960s had a polarizing effect. It widened the gulf between
conservative and progressive parties and between the reforming and
revolutionary wings of socialist parties. More often than not, the
moderate center suffered. The pragmatic relationship between
conservative American and socialist European tendencies seemed to have outlived its usefulness.
Opposition to communism in principle became unfashionable. The
basic differences between democracy and communism were lost from
sight. It was considered more rewarding to seek out common interests
through increasing East-West scientific, cultural, and sporting
exchanges that, it was thought, would contribute to the liberalization
of communist regimes. In the 1960s anticommunist writers virtually
lost their admission tickets to the communications media; their
attitude was deemed inimical to detente.4 European radio and
television organizations negotiated their own arrangements with their
official Soviet government counterparts. The need for anticommunist
broadcasts was called into question. The direct anticommunist content
was drastically reduced.5 Attention was focused instead on the Sino-
Soviet split, other fissures in the bloc, and the growth of dissident
movements. Official and semiofficial funding of noncommunist
cultural and student organizations for the purpose of countering
communist fronts was largely discontinued.
Soviet expansionism in Africa and the intervention in Afghanistan at
the end of 1979 drew attention to underlying Soviet aggressiveness.
Some of the more naive Western illusions about detente were
shattered. At the same time Western reactions to the Soviet action
demonstrated the extent to which vested interests in detente had been
built up in the West, not least in West Germany and France. Despite
American opposition, the West Germans and French have shown
themselves determined to proceed with the construction of a gas
pipeline from the Soviet Union to Western Europe. It is doubtful if the
Afghan situation will alter long-term Western attitudes to detente any
more than did the Cuban crisis of 1962. It has not dissipated long-term
Western expectations, fostered by twenty years of communist
disinformation, that the decay of ideology and the growth of internal
opposition will lead eventually to the liberalization of the Soviet
regime.
Meanwhile, China's vigorously expressed hostility to the Soviet
Union offers apparent prospects of alliance with the West on the basis
of a common interest in containing Soviet expansionism. Because
there has been no understanding in the West either of disinformation
or of long-range communist policy and the scissors strategy, "playing
the China card" is now regarded as a serious strategic option for the
United States.

Conclusion
Communist strategic disinformation has had a profound influence
on international relations. Western governments and their professional
advisers have remained oblivious of the problem. The fundamental
purpose of the disinformation program has been to create favorable
conditions for the fulfillment of long-range communist policy. The
communist strategists have achieved their purpose thus far by
misleading the West on developments in the communist world with
three main aims in view: to relieve Western pressure on the
communist regimes while they are "building socialism" and laying the
groundwork for an eventual worldwide federation of communist
states; to provoke the Western responses they desire to their activist
diplomacy and international communist strategy; and to prepare the
ground for a major shift in communist tactics in the final phase of
policy in the 1980s.
The success of the communist disinformation program has engendered
a state of crisis in Western assessments of communist affairs
and therefore a crisis in Western policy toward the communist world.
The meaning of developments in the communist bloc is
misunderstood and the intentions behind communist actions are
misinterpreted. Enemies are accepted and treated as though they were
allies of the West. The Soviet military threat is recognized, but the
strategic political threat is not comprehended and is therefore
underestimated. Communist political offensives, in the form of detente
diplomacy and disarmament negotiations, are seen as indications of
communist moderation. Communist strategy, instead of being
blocked, is unwittingly assisted by Western policies.
The first communist strategy of strengthening and stabilizing the
bloc politically and economically has been assisted by Western
economic aid and by the acceptance of detente and cooperation with
communist governments. By responding favorably to communist
initiatives on SALT and collective security in Europe, the West has
helped the communist strategists to prepare the ground for the
dissolution of NATO and the withdrawal of US troops from Europe.
By accepting Yugoslavia as independent, the West has given her the
opportunity to organize much of the Third World into a socialistorientated
bloc with a procommunist, anti-Western bias. By accepting
Sino-Soviet rivalry as genuine and considering
China as a possible ally against Soviet expansionism, the West is
creating opportunities for the construction of new alignments that will
rebound, in the long run, to its own detriment. By engaging in SALT
talks and agreements with inadequate awareness of communist longrange
policy and strategy and by providing advanced technology first
to the Soviet Union, then to China, the West has helped to shift the
balance of military power against itself. Failing to appreciate the
control over communist intellectual and religious figures and taking
detente at its face value, the West has been ready to accept the notion
of a long-term evolution of communism and its ultimate convergence
with the democratic system. The West has assisted communist
ideological strategy by its own unilateral ideological disarmament.
The spurious notion of a common interest between the United
States and the Soviet Union against China in the 1960s was deliberately
contrived and successfully exploited in the interests of communist
strategy. The same can be said of the common interest between
Eastern and Western Europe in seeking collective security against
West German "revanchism" and American "interference"; or the
common interest between communist and developing countries in the
struggle against "imperialism"; or the common interest between
China, Japan, and the West in resisting Soviet expansionism. Even the
genuine common interest between the Soviet Union and the United
States in avoiding nuclear conflict has been successfully exploited to
swing the military balance in favor of the communist bloc.
The Western strategy of a mildly activist approach to Eastern
Europe, with emphasis on human rights, is doomed to failure because
it is based on misconceptions and will lead ultimately into a trap when
a further spurious liberalization takes place in Eastern Europe in the
final phase of long-range communist policy. Not the least disturbing
aspect of the present crisis in Western assessments and policy is that,
if it is recognized at all, its causes are misunderstood. As matters stand
the West is acutely vulnerable to the coming major shift in communist
tactics in the final phase of their policy.

[Sarah]

Sino-Soviet Duality and Communist Strategy in the Third World
Seen in the light of the new methodology, the Chinese effort in the
Third World is complementary to that of the other communist states
and an important element in communist strategy as a whole.
The character of the Chinese effort in the Third World from 1958
onward was dictated by China's historical background and current
capacities. China had been freed from colonial oppression by a
prolonged liberation struggle with Japan. The Chinese party had
learned how to exploit conditions of military conflict to deepen its
influence and win power. As a rule, Chinese and Soviet efforts can be
seen in terms not of rivalry, but of a coordinated division of labor that
has brought dividends for the common strategy.
Where a serious dispute exists between two Third World countries,
a pattern in Soviet and Chinese policies can be discerned in which the
Soviet Union and China take up opposite sides and adopt a clearcut
duality in their policies. The Soviet Union seeks
to build up its influence with one party to the dispute and China with
the other. The classic example of this pattern is to be seen in the case
of India and Pakistan.
The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was provoked by the Chinese. The
Soviets took a broadly anti-Chinese and pro-Indian line that gained
them goodwill in India. At the time of the outbreak of open Sino-
Soviet party polemics in 1963, an Indian army and air force mission
visited the Soviet Union. In the following year the Indian defense
minister went to Moscow to discuss Soviet-Indian military
cooperation. Further exchanges of military delegations took place in
1967 and 1968. In the mid-1960s regular consultations on problems of
mutual interest were instituted between the Soviet and Indian foreign
ministries.1 The United States held India responsible for the Indo-
Pakistani conflict in 1971 and terminated military aid to India. The
Soviets called for a cessation of the conflict but nevertheless gave the
Indians moral support, for which Mrs. Gandhi expressed her gratitude.
A treaty of friendship was signed between the Soviet Union and India
in August 1971. An influx of Soviet visitors followed. In October
Firyubin went to India, interestingly enough in the same month as
Tito. He was followed in the next three months by the chief of Soviet
military aviation, Kutakhov, and the deputy foreign minister, V. V.
Kuznetsov. In December Mrs. Gandhi condemned American policy in
Vietnam.2 In 1973 an agreement was signed for cooperation between
Gosplan, the Soviet planning agency, and the Indian planning
commission.3
Largely because of skillful Soviet exploitation of the conflict between
India and Pakistan, by the mid-1970s the trend toward closer
Soviet-Indian relations had become virtually irreversible. The Desai
government was unable to stem the tide. Relations were further
cemented by Brezhnev's visit and talks with Mrs. Gandhi in 1981.
While the Soviets were strengthening their hold in India, the
Chinese were doing the same in Pakistan, using the same techniques
of exchanges of visits and military delegations, especially during the
years 1962-67. When the United States ceased military aid to Pakistan
in 1967, the Chinese stepped theirs up. In 1968 President Yahya Khan
and his foreign minister visited China. Further cooperation developed.
In 1970 Kuo Mo-jo visited Pakistan. Pakistan was sufficiently close to
China to be used as an intermediary in arranging the visit of Kissinger
to China in 1971. Bhutto was received by Mao in 1972 after the further conflict with India and the
formation of Bangladesh. The conflict resulted in Pakistan's departure
from the British Commonwealth and SEATO. Further high-level
exchanges of visits continued between Pakistan and China, regardless
of changes in the Pakistani government.
As in the case of Soviet influence in India, Chinese influence in
Pakistan is creating conditions for an alliance between them and for
an eventual communist takeover. A situation already exists that can be
further exploited by calculated and coordinated Soviet and Chinese
moves, for example, in connection with the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan.
The recent Chinese moderation is intended to help build up the new
image of respectability required by the Chinese for their detente
diplomacy vis-a-vis the advanced industrial, as well as Third World,
countries. It is also consistent with the emerging pattern of Sino-
Soviet duality; while the Soviet Union builds up united fronts with
nationalists against the United States, China seeks to ensnare the
United States and other conservative countries, including the Asian
and African states, in artificial, treacherous alliances with herself and
her associates, ostensibly against the Soviet Union. In this way China
seeks to enter her enemies' camp not merely unopposed, but
welcomed as an ally against Soviet expansionism and equipped with
Western arms.
In the present phase of policy, neither the Soviet Union nor China
puts local communist parties in general in the forefront as strategic
weapons. When the objective of isolating the United States from the
Third World has been achieved, local communist parties will come
into their own and accounts will be settled with nationalists who have
suppressed them in the past.
Sino-Soviet Duality and Military Strategy
The new methodology illuminates the contribution to the success of
communist strategies made by the division of labor between the
Soviets and Chinese and the coordinated duality of their policies.
In the early years of detente, paraphrasing Lenin's words, the
Chinese were given a "terrible double bass" to play in contrast with
the Soviets' "sentimental violin." While the Soviets were emphasising
detente and peaceful coexistence and taking up high-level
contacts with American and European leaders, the Chinese advocated
militant and violent revolution. Marked divergences appeared in the
treatment in the Soviet and Chinese press of Khrushchev's visit to the
United States in 1959. In February 1960, three months before the
abortive summit meeting in Paris, the Chinese delegate at the Warsaw
Pact conference criticized the Soviets for their rapprochement with the
"imperialists," who had refused to make concessions on Berlin. On the
eve of Khrushchev's meeting with the French President in April 1960,
the Chinese press resumed its criticism of the Yugoslav "revisionists"
and published articles calling for a militant, revolutionary approach to
world problems while the Soviet press continued to emphasize
moderation and peaceful coexistence.
Further divergences appeared in Soviet and Chinese handling of the
Cuban and Sino-Indian crises in 1962, but perhaps the most striking
instance of duality in the early 1960s occurred during the Soviet-
American-British negotiations on the Atomic Test Ban Treaty in 1963.
The arrival in Moscow of the Anglo-American delegation that was to
conduct those negotiations was immediately preceded by the arrival of
a Chinese delegation that was to conduct party negotiations with the
CPSU. Soviet warmth toward the Western delegations contrasted
sharply with their coolness toward the Chinese. Progress on the test
ban talks was accompanied by the apparent failure of the Sino-Soviet
negotiations. The signature of the test ban treaty was followed by
interruption of the Sino-Soviet talks, attacks in the Chinese press on
Soviet policy in the test ban negotiations, and open polemics between
the Soviet and Chinese parties. A further eruption of Sino-Soviet
polemics occurred before the Soviet-American negotiations on a
nuclear nonprolifera-tion treaty in 1966-67.
Subsequent events have shown just how little foundation there was
for Chinese accusations that the Soviets had capitulated to Western
imperialism in the 1960s and had sacrificed "socialist solidarity" and
support for revolutionary struggle on the altar of peaceful
coexistence.4 The effect of these Chinese accusations at the time was
to promote Western illusions about Soviet moderation, and thus to
create favorable conditions for the success of Soviet activist
diplomacy toward the United States and European NATO
powers. In contrast with the implacable Chinese dogmatists, the
Soviets appeared cautious, reasonable, nonideological, pragmatic
communists with whom it was possible to negotiate a deal. Furthermore,
they appeared sincere in their claim to have a common interest
with the West in restraining Chinese influence.
Sino-Soviet duality produced the effect on the West that the
communist strategists intended. It seems safe to say that it brought
them substantial dividends. For example, had it not been for General
de Gaulle's belief in the sincerity of Soviet interest in detente and his
confidence in the authenticity of the Sino-Soviet split, it is more than
doubtful that he would have gone as far as he did in his dealings with
the Soviet Union, his recognition of Communist China, and his
withdrawal of France from its military commitments to NATO.
From 1958 to 1969, despite all the sound and fury, China, by
comparison with the Soviet Union, was passive diplomatically in
relation to the Western powers. The contrast was only natural. The
Soviet Union was already a military superpower engaged in strategic
competition with the United States and NATO. The Soviets had a
solid background of experience in dealing with the Western powers
and a well-trained staff to carry out their policies. China was militarily
insignificant, unrecognized by the United States and many other
countries and short of trained and indoctrinated diplomatic staff. The
onset of the Cultural Revolution brought a further retreat into
diplomatic isolation.
In 1969 all this began to change. With the completion of the
Cultural Revolution, China reemerged onto the international scene.
Chinese activist detente diplomacy was launched. Trade, and especially
the acquisition of advanced technology, bulked large among the
obvious Chinese motives. In January 1969 a special West German
ambassador, Egon Bahr, was invited to conduct trade negotiations in
Shanghai. Exchanges of visits between Chinese and Western
statesmen and military leaders became commonplace. A drive to
obtain diplomatic recognition soon brought results. By 1970 it had
been granted by fifty-five countries. On October 25, 1971, Communist
China was seated in the United Nations; by 1973, it had diplomatic
relations with ninety-one countries. In February 1972, after two
preparatory visits by Kissinger (carried out initially in great secrecy
and without consultation with the Japanese, the
most directly concerned of America's close allies), President Nixon
visited China. He was followed by the British foreign secretary,
Douglas-Home; by President Pompidou of France in 1973; and by the
West German chancellor, Schmidt, in 1975. The German and British
conservative opposition leaders, Strauss and Thatcher, visited in 1975
and 1977 respectively, and the British foreign secretary, Crosland, in
1976. In return Chinese ministerial visits were paid to the United
States and Europe, culminating in Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to the
United States and Japan and Chairman Hua's journey through Europe
in 1979. In the same year the U.S. President's national security
adviser, Brzezinski, visited China, followed in the aftermath of Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan by the defense secretary, Brown. The
exchanges of visits between China and the United States, Western
Europe, and Japan reflected not only the development of trade with,
and credits for, China, but also the transfer of Western technology for
China's industrial modernization and rearmament.